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Abstract
The security of strong designated verifier (SDV) sig-
nature schemes has thus far been analyzed only in a
two-user setting. We observe that security in a two-
user setting does not necessarily imply the same in a
multi-user setting for SDV signatures. Moreover, we
show that existing security notions do not adequately
model the security of SDV signatures even in a two-
user setting. We then propose revised notions of secu-
rity in a multi-user setting and show that no existing
scheme satisfies these notions. A new SDV signature
scheme is then presented and proven secure under the
revised notions in the standard model. For the pur-
pose of constructing the SDV signature scheme, we
propose a one-pass key establishment protocol in the
standard model, which is of independent interest in
itself.
Keywords. Strong designated verifier signa-
tures, multi-user setting, standard model, one-pass
key establishment
1 Introduction
An undeniable signature (Chaum & van Antwerpen
1989) allows a signer to have complete control over
her signature by forcing the verification to be carried
out only with her interactive cooperation. The signer
can reject a signature that she never generated and at
the same time cannot deny her own signature. How-
ever, if a group of verifiers collude, she may not be
able to control who can verify the signature (Desmedt
& Yung 1991). Later, Jakobsson (1994) shows that
undeniable signatures are vulnerable to blackmailing
attacks.
As a solution to these problems, Jakobsson, Sako
& Impagliazzo (1996) introduce the concept of des-
ignated verifier (DV) signature that convinces only a
single verifier, designated by the signer, of the valid-
ity of the signature. This is achieved by allowing a
designated verifier to produce a simulated signature
that is indistinguishable from an original DV signa-
ture. Note that if both the signer and the designated
verifier in a DV signature scheme can produce per-
fectly indistinguishable signatures, the DV signature
scheme cannot offer non-repudiation. Thus, the ori-
gin of a DV signature is kept ambiguous between the
signer and designated verifier to a third party even
with the knowledge of both signer’s and verifier’s pri-
vate keys. Although a DV signature does not necessi-
tate an interaction between the signer and verifier, it
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requires the verifier to have a public-private key pair.
SDV signatures. Jakobsson et al. (1996) briefly
describe a weaker trust model (stronger security no-
tion) called “strong designated verifier”. Informally,
this notion says that only the designated verifier
should be able to distinguish between the transcripts
of a strong DV (SDV) signature generated by a le-
gitimate signer and any other transcripts simulated
by a third party. For all the other users these tran-
scripts should remain computationally indistinguish-
able. Hence, only the designated verifier can verify
and get convinced of the validity of an original SDV
signature.
We use an example from Saeednia, Kremer &
Markowitch (2003) to explain a typical scenario where
SDV signatures are applicable. Suppose a public in-
stitution initiates a call for tenders asking price quo-
tations for a task to be accomplished. The institution
requires the participating companies to digitally sign
their quotations in order to make sure that they are
authentic. At the same time the companies may not
want the institution to take advantage by showing
their quotations to other companies (e.g. to get lower
quotations). We can employ DV signatures in this
scenario with the companies acting as signers and the
institution as the designated verifier. However, a ma-
licious participant can passively eavesdrop on the in-
stitution’s incoming communication and easily make
out that the captured DV signatures are not simu-
lated by the institution. As the verification process
for DV signatures does not require any secret infor-
mation, it will be convinced that the signature has
been generated by a legitimate signer and can make
a quotation to its advantage. Hence, we require the
signature to be SDV signature.
Jakobsson et al. suggest that the transcripts of
a DV signature should be probabilistically encrypted
with the designated verifier’s public key to arrive at
an SDV signature. However, as argued by Raimondo
& Gennaro (2005) for the case of deniable authenti-
cation, it is not clear why encryption must be used
to build authentication protocols. Moreover, the ad-
ditional layer of encryption on top of a DV signa-
ture clearly makes the resulting SDV signature less
efficient than the underlying DV signature. Saeednia
et al. (2003) address this issue and propose an efficient
SDV signature scheme, without employing public key
encryption.
Tso, Okamoto & Okamoto (2005) propose that an
SDV signature scheme can be obtained using any one-
pass key establishment (OPKE)1 protocol. However,
if the OPKE protocol uses signature-based authen-
ticators, any third party can easily distinguish the
resulting SDV signature’s transcripts from simulated
ones. Hence, there cannot be a generic way of ob-
1One-pass key establishment facilitates two parties to establish
a shared secret by transmitting a single message. More details in
Section 5
taining SDV signatures from OPKE protocols. But,
this approach is worth exploring for a concrete OPKE
protocol, particularly if the resulting SDV signature
offers better security properties and is more efficient
than existing SDV signatures.
Security for SDV signatures. Al-
though Jakobsson et al. (1996) and Saeednia
et al. (2003) propose ways of constructing SDV
signature schemes, they do not provide formal
notions of security for SDV signatures. Laguillaumie
& Vergnaud (2004) are the first to propose formal
notions of security for SDV signatures. All existing
SDV schemes (Saeednia et al. 2003, Laguillaumie
& Vergnaud 2004, Tso et al. 2005, Huang, Susilo,
Mu & Zhang 2006) have been analyzed under these
notions. However, the notions of Laguillaumie and
Vergnaud are only for a two-user setting. We show
that security of an SDV signature in a two-user
setting does not necessarily imply the same in a
multi-user setting, which is a more realistic setting.
We then argue that even if we extend the notions of
Laugillaumie and Vergnaud to a multi-user setting,
they do not adequately model the security of SDV
signatures.
Contributions. We revise existing notions of
security for SDV signatures with appropriate justi-
fication. We then show that none of the previously
published SDV signature schemes is secure under the
revised notions. A concrete SDV signature that is se-
cure under the revised notions is then presented. The
main tool in constructing the SDV signature scheme
is a newly proposed OPKE protocol. This protocol is
proven secure in the standard model and is indepen-
dent interest in itself. Specifically, our contributions
are:
• Revised notions of security for SDV signatures
• Attacks on all existing SDV signature schemes
• A new SDV signature scheme in the standard
model
• A one-pass key establishment protocol in the
standard model
Organization. Section 2 explains why SDV sig-
natures must be analyzed in a multi-user setting and
also justifies the appropriateness of security notions
we consider. Section 3 presents new notions of se-
curity for SDV signatures and we show that existing
schemes are insecure under these notions in Section 4.
Section 5 presents a security model for OPKE pro-
tocols and a new OPKE protocol secure under this
model. A concrete SDV signature with proofs of se-
curity in the standard model is proposed in Section 6.
Appendix A explains preliminary concepts, while Ap-
pendices B and C provide proofs of security.
2 On Existing Notions of Security for SDV
Signatures
We first informally describe notions of security that
may be used to analyze an SDV signature scheme.
Out of these notions, we consider unforgeability, in-
visibility and non-transferability. Their appropriate-
ness for analyzing SDV signature schemes is justified
later. The idea behind this section is to explain the
reader that existing notions of security for SDV sig-
natures are not adequate. Formal definitions appear
in Section 3.
Unforgeability. Being a public key signature,
we require an SDV signature to be existentially un-
forgeable against chosen message attack (UF-CMA).
However, the definition of UF-CMA for an SDV sig-
nature differs from that for a normal signature as the
designated verifier can also simulate the SDV signa-
ture. UF-CMA for SDV signature ensures that no-
body other than the signer or the designated verifier
can produce a valid SDV signature on a random mes-
sage. This notion may be suitably called outsider
unforgeability.
Invisibility. Invisibility against chosen message
attack (IV-CMA) ensures that only the designated
verifier can distinguish the transcripts of an SDV sig-
nature from a uniformly random element of the signa-
ture space. This implies that a receiver cannot verify
the validity of an SDV signature unless it is desig-
nated to him. Saeednia et al. (2003) suggest that even
a signer who does not keep record of her own tran-
scripts should not be able to distinguish between real
transcripts and random elements of signature space.
This additional restriction is taken into account by al-
lowing the adversary to corrupt the signer. It allows
us to model “forward invisibility”.
Non-transferability. The notion of non-
transferability against chosen message attack (NT-
CMA) is originally defined by Steinfeld, Bull, Wang
& Pieprzyk (2003) for universal DV signatures and
is regarded as a desired notion also for DV signa-
tures (Lipmaa, Wang & Bao 2005). NT-CMA makes
the origin of a DV signature ambiguous between the
signer and the designated verifier and consequently
prevents the designated verifier from convincing a
third-party about the same. This notion has not been
considered for any existing SDV signature scheme.
Privacy of Signer’s Identity. Laguillaumie &
Vergnaud (2004) define privacy of signer’s identity
against chosen message attack (PSI-CMA) as a de-
sired notion of security for SDV signatures. This no-
tion ensures that it is computationally infeasible for
anybody without the knowledge of the private key of
the signer or designated verifier to determine the ori-
gin of an SDV signature generated by a legitimate
signer.
Non-delegatability. Lipmaa et al. (2005) de-
fine non-delegatability against chosen message attack
for DV signatures. This notion demands that it
should be computationally infeasible for the signer or
designated verifier to delegate the signing or verifica-
tion capabilities respectively, without disclosing the
corresponding private key.
We now describe the necessity of considering the
security of SDV signatures in a multi-user setting.
The justification for preferring IV-CMA to PSI-CMA
and considering NT-CMA for analyzing the SDV sig-
nature schemes is then explained.
2.1 UF-CMA in a Multi-user Setting
We show that security under UF-CMA for SDV signa-
tures in a two-user setting does not imply the same in
a multi-user setting. We use an example construction
of Baek, Steinfeld & Zheng (2007), originally given in
the context of signcryption, for this purpose. Let Σ be
an SDV signature scheme secure under the UF-CMA
notion in a two-user setting and let σ be its sign-
ing algorithm’s output. We construct another SDV
signature scheme Σ′ such that the output of signing
algorithm of Σ′ is σ′ = σ‖b, where b is a bit from the
signer’s private key. The position of b is determined
by a function of the designated verifier’s public key.
In the security model for a two-user setting the adver-
sary is allowed to query the signing oracle using only
one receiver’s public key. Although the adversary can
get a single bit of the signer’s private key, Σ′ remains
UF-CMA secure in a two-user setting. However, in a
multi-user setting where the adversary should be al-
lowed to query the signing oracle with different desig-
nated verifiers’ public keys, all the bits of the signer’s
private key can be easily recovered. Thus, Σ′ becomes
trivially forgeable in this setting.
2.2 PSI-CMA in a Multi-user Setting
Laguillaumie & Vergnaud (2004) show that encrypt-
ing the transcripts of a DV signature using an IND-
CCA2 public key encryption scheme results in an
SDV signature secure under PSI-CMA. But, using
such encryption is computationally expensive and
thus the aim has been to achieve PSI-CMA without
doing so. Hence, Laguillaumie and Vergnaud also pro-
pose a concrete SDV signature scheme without using
public key encryption, which is claimed to satisfy the
PSI-CMA notion. The authors also give proofs of se-
curity for earlier schemes (Saeednia et al. 2003, Stein-
feld, Wang & Pieprzyk 2004) under this notion. These
analyzes are done only in a two-user setting. However,
we explain below that an SDV signature scheme that
does not employ public key encryption cannot satisfy
PSI-CMA in a multi-user setting.
Recall the example in Section 1, where a pub-
lic institution initiates call for tenders. As in any
other public key signature, the participating compa-
nies, acting as signers, have to send their public key
certificate along with the SDV signature so that the
institution, acting as designated verifier, can verify
the signature. However, if the transcripts are not en-
crypted a passive adversary can easily identify the
origin of the signature, trivially exposing the signer’s
identity.
It may be assumed that the signer’s certificate
does not accompany the SDV signature and also that
the designated verifier has the certificates of all the
signers. However, in this case the designated veri-
fier unnecessarily has to do large number2 of verifi-
cations, which could easily make the scheme far less
efficient than a scheme that employs public key en-
cryption. Another possible solution is to consider a
seemingly weaker notion that guarantees reasonable
security and at the same time can be realized by ef-
ficient SDV signature schemes. We follow the later
approach and formalize the notion of IV-CMA for an-
alyzing SDV signature schemes.
PSI-CMA vs. IV-CMA. As discussed above, an
SDV signature scheme that has signer’s public key
certificate in the transcripts cannot guarantee PSI-
CMA. But, such a scheme can satisfy the IV-CMA no-
tion defined in Section 3.2 (For example, our proposed
SDV signature scheme guarantees IV-CMA). On the
other hand, it seems that PSI-CMA is a stronger no-
tion than IV-CMA (Galbraith & W.Mao 2003). We
leave the task of formally establishing relation be-
tween PSI-CMA and IV-CMA for future work.
Forward Invisibility. As stated earlier we
model forward invisibility by allowing the adversary
to corrupt the signer. We explain the necessity of
considering forward invisibility using the example in
Section 1. In this scenario, assume that the mutu-
ally distrusting companies acting as signers collude
among themselves by revealing their private keys to
each other. The goal of these companies is to max-
imize the bid as much as possible and make one of
the group members win the contract. The others
may receive some share for their cooperation. If the
SDV signature used is forward invisible, the colluded
members cannot verify the other members’ quotations
even if their private keys are revealed. On the other
hand, if the SDV signature used is not forward invis-
ible, the colluded members can make sure that every
other colluded member is bidding to a predetermined
2In the above example the institution has to do O(n2) verifica-
tions, instead of the much desired n verifications, where n is the
number of participants.
value assigned to it. We show in Section 4 that none
of the existing schemes is forward invisible.
2.3 The necessity of considering NT-CMA
Laguillaumie & Vergnaud (2004) argue that the no-
tion of PSI-CMA implies NT-CMA and the existing
SDV signature schemes (Saeednia et al. 2003, Laguil-
laumie & Vergnaud 2004, Huang et al. 2006) are for-
mally analyzed only under UF-CMA and PSI-CMA.
However, we show that PSI-CMA does not necessar-
ily imply NT-CMA by constructing a simple scheme
that satisfies UF-CMA and PSI-CMA but does not
guarantee NT-CMA.
Assume that an SDV signature is constructed by
encrypting a signer’s UF-CMA secure normal signa-
ture with the public key of the designated verifier.
The resulting SDV signature is UF-CMA secure if an
IND-CCA2 encryption scheme is used (An, Dodis &
Rabin 2002). We have earlier discussed that if the
encryption scheme is IND-CCA2 secure then the re-
sulting SDV signature provides PSI-CMA. Note that
PSI-CMA assumes that the adversary does not have
either the private key of the signer or that of the des-
ignated verifier. This construction clearly does not
satisfy NT-CMA. The designated verifier can always
show to a third party that the decrypted publicly veri-
fiable signature is one from the original signer. Hence,
for an SDV signature scheme to be considered secure
it must also be analyzed under NT-CMA.
2.4 Notions Omitted
Lipmaa et al. (2005) and Li, Lipmaa & Pei (2005)
observe that many DV signature and SDV signa-
ture schemes do not have this property. Lipmaa et
al. propose a DV signature scheme that is claimed
to formally satisfy this notion. However, as ob-
served by (Kudla (2006), p.81) the proof of non-
delegatability for this DV signature scheme gives the
adversary the same oracle access and seems to have
the same objective as in the unforgeability notion.
Moreover, it is not clarified what access the adver-
sary has to the functions of the private keys. It is not
possible to formally specify these functions as they
may vary from scheme to scheme. Hence, we do not
consider non-delegatability for analyzing SDV signa-
tures.
3 Security of SDV Signatures in a Multi-user
Setting
An SDV signature scheme is specified by four polyno-
mial time algorithms: common-key-gen, user-key-gen,
sign and verify.
common-key-gen: is a probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) algorithm that takes the security param-
eter k as input and outputs the common/public
parameters params used in the scheme. These
parameters include description of the underlying
groups, hash functions and signature space S etc.
user-key-gen: is a PPT algorithm that takes params
as input and outputs the user’s public-private key
pair (pk, sk). Note that the same key pair can be
used in the sign or verify algorithms depending on
the role the user plays in the scheme.
sign: is a PPT algorithm that takes params, signer’s
private key sks, verifier’s public key pkv and a
message m as input. An SDV signature σ ∈ S
created for a designated verifier with public key
pkv is returned as output.
verify: is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm
that takes params, signer’s public key pks, veri-
fier’s private key skv, a message m and an SDV
signature σ. It outputs a boolean value true if σ
is valid SDV signature created on m under sks
and pkv. Otherwise false is returned.
We assume that all the designated verifiers’ public
keys are registered with a key registration authority
(KRA) in a direct key registration protocol i.e. the
KRA checks that the users know their private keys.
We now present the desired notions of security for an
SDV signature scheme namely, UF-CMA, IV-CMA
and NT-CMA in a multi-user setting. Depending on
the notion of security, an adversary against an SDV
signature scheme is allowed ask the below queries:
The challenger runs the user-key-gen algorithm for
n users and generates public-private key pairs for
them. Without loss of generality, let (pks, sks) and
(pkv, skv) be the public-private key pairs of a signer
and a designated verifier respectively.
sign queries: On a sign query with the input
(m, pks, pkv), the adversary A is given the SDV
signature σ computed on the message m using
the keys sks and pkv.
verify queries: On a verify(m,σ, pks, pkv), A is re-
turned an output true if σ is a valid SDV signa-
ture on m under the keys sks and pkv. Other-
wise, false is returned.
simulate queries: On a Simulate query with input
(m, pks, pkv), a simulated signature σ′ computed
on the message m using the keys pks and skv is
returned to A.
corrupt queries: On a corrupt query issued on a user
U with public-private key pair (pk, sk), the pri-
vate key sk is returned to A.
3.1 Unforgeability
An adversary Au against the UF-CMA notion of
an SDV signature is allowed to issue sign, verify
and corrupt queries. Finally, it outputs a forgery
(m∗, σ∗, pk∗s , pk
∗
v). For Au to win the game, the fol-
lowing conditions must hold:
1. σ∗ is a valid SDV signature i.e. ver-
ify(m∗, σ∗, pk∗s , sk
∗
v) = true
2. σ∗ has not been an output of an earlier sign query
(sign queries with input (m∗, pks, pkv) for pks =
pk∗s and pkv = pk
∗
v are also allowed)
3. there has been no corrupt query issued to the
user U∗s or U
∗
v with the public keys pk
∗
s or pk
∗
v
respectively.
The advantage of Au, AdvAu(k), against the UF-
CMA notion of SDV signature is given as its prob-
ability of winning the above game. We say that an
SDV signature scheme is secure under the UF-CMA
notion if AdvAu(k) is negligible. Note that our no-
tion of UF-CMA for SDV signatures models strong
unforgeability.
3.2 Invisibility
An adversary Ai against the IV-CMA notion of an
SDV signature is allowed to issue sign, verify and cor-
rupt queries. At the end of stage 1, Ai outputs a
message m∗, a signer’s public key pk∗s and a verifier’s
public key pk∗v .
The challenger randomly chooses b R← {0, 1}. If
b = 0, Ai is given a valid SDV signature σ∗ computed
on the message m∗ using sk∗s and pk
∗
v . Otherwise,
σ∗ is chosen uniformly at random from the signature
space S and returned to Ai. Ai can continue asking
the queries in stage 2. Finally, it outputs a bit b′. Ai
wins the IV-CMA game if the following conditions
hold:
1. b′ = b
2. there has been no verify query with the input
(m∗, σ∗, pk∗s , pk
∗
v)
3. the user with the public key pk∗v remains uncor-
rupted (the user with the public key pk∗s may be
corrupted at any time)
The advantage of Ai in winning the above game is:
AdvAi(k) = |2 · Pr[b′ = b]− 1|
We say that an SDV signature scheme is secure under
the IV-CMA notion if AdvAi(k) is negligible.
3.3 Non-transferability
We say that an SDV signature is NT-CMA secure
if there exists a polynomial time algorithm simulate
that on input (pks, pkv, skv,m) produces a valid SDV
signature σ′ such that the outputs of the sign and sim-
ulate algorithms are indistinguishable. An adversary
An against the NT-CMA notion of an SDV signa-
ture is allowed to issue simulate queries in addition to
sign, verify and corrupt queries. At the end of stage 1,
An outputs a message m∗ and a signer’s public key
pk∗s and a designated verifier’s public key pk
∗
v . These
two users might already have been corrupted. The
challenger chooses a bit b. If b = 0 it runs the sign
algorithm, otherwise runs the simulate algorithm with
(m∗, pk∗s , pk
∗
v) as input and produces a signature σ
∗
and returns it to An. An can continue asking queries
to the oracles and there is no restriction on the type
of query. Finally, An outputs a bit b′ and wins the
game if b′ = b.
The advantage of An in winning the above game
is:
AdvAn(k) = |2 · Pr[b′ = b]− 1|
We say that an SDV signature scheme is secure under
the NT-CMA notion if AdvAn(k) is negligible.
Note that this notion allows the adversary to cor-
rupt any user including the users with key pairs
(sk∗s , pk
∗
s) and (sk
∗
v , pk
∗
v). Hence, a scheme secure
under the NT-CMA notion guarantees perfect non-
transferability.
4 The Security of Existing Schemes
Before presenting our generic construction and its in-
stantiation, we first show that the previously pub-
lished SDV signature schemes do not satisfy the IV-
CMA notion defined in Section 3.2. Particularly, we
show that these schemes do not have forward invisi-
bility.
4.1 Deterministic SDV Signature Schemes
The SDV signature schemes of Tso et al.
(2005), Huang et al. (2006) and Bhaskar, Her-
ranz & Laguillaumie (2006) depend on the static
Diffie-Hellman key between the signer and designated
verifier. In these schemes, if the private key of the
signer is revealed to Ai, it can compute the static
shared key. With this key Ai can easily win the
IV-CMA game by checking whether the challenge
SDV signature is real or random. Similarly, the
ID-based short SDV signature of Huang et al. (2006),
which depends on the ID-based non-interactive key
sharing (Sakai, Ohgishi & Kasahara 2000), can be
shown insecure under the IV-CMA.
It should also be noted that these schemes (Tso
et al. 2005, Huang et al. 2006, Bhaskar et al. 2006)
have deterministic signing algorithms and thus pro-
duce the same SDV signature between two users on
a given message. However, the existing notion PSI-
CMA for two-user setting defined by Laguillaumie &
Vergnaud (2004) requires the signing algorithm to be
a randomized one. Hence, although these schemes
are claimed to be secure under PSI-CMA, they are
actually not. As PSI-CMA and IV-CMA (without
forward invisibility) are equivalent in the two-user set-
ting, they can’t be secure under the IV-CMA notion
even in the two-user setting. These schemes can nev-
ertheless be proven secure in a weaker notion. How-
ever, it implies that once the adversary knows that a
given SDV signature is generated by a signer, the next
signature by the signer on the same message cannot
be secure under PSI-CMA.
4.2 Saeednia et al. 2003
The public parameters in this scheme are (p, q, g, h),
where p is a large prime, q is a prime factor of p −
1, g ∈ Z∗p is a generator of order q and h is a one-
way function that outputs values in Zq. The public-
private key pairs of users Aˆ and Bˆ are (A = ga, a)
and (B = gb, b) respectively.
The SDV signature generated by Aˆ for Bˆ on a
message m is (r, s, t). The signer computes this sig-
nature by selecting two random values k ∈ Zq, t ∈ Z∗q
and calculating c = Bk mod p, r = h(m, c) and
s = kt−1 − ra mod q. If the signer’s private key
a is revealed, Ai can decide whether a given chal-
lenge SDV signature is real or random as follows. Let
(r∗, s∗, t∗) be the challenge SDV signature, Ai can
compute k∗ as k∗ = (s∗ + r∗a)t∗ mod q and then
c∗ = Bk
∗
mod p. If r∗ = h(m, c∗), Ai correctly
guesses the challenge SDV signature as real, other-
wise as random. Note that Ai wins this game with
probability 1 by reconstructing the SDV signature.
4.3 Laguillaumie and Vergnaud 2004
The public parameters are
(q,G0, P0,G1, P1,GT , e, h), where q is a prime
number, G0, G1 and GT are groups of order q,
P0 and P1 are generators of G0 and G1 respec-
tively, e : G0 × G1 → GT is an admissible bilinear
map (Boneh & Franklin 2001) and h is a hash
function that maps to G1. Let (PA = aP0, a) and
(PB = bP0, b) be the public-private key pairs of Aˆ
and Bˆ respectively.
The SDV signature of Aˆ on the message m for the
user Bˆ is (r, s), where r is a randomly selected string
and s is computed as s = e(PB , aH) for H = h(m, r).
Note that in this scheme the random seed is also
part of the SDV signature that is sent over a pub-
lic channel. Hence, in this scheme if Ai corrupts the
signer and obtains the private key a, it can win the
IV-CMA game by reconstructing the SDV signature.
Given a challenge SDV signature (r∗, s∗), Ai com-
putes H∗ = h(m, r∗) and checks if s∗ = e(PB , aH∗).
If so it correctly guesses the SDV signature as real,
otherwise as random.
4.4 Susilo et al. 2004
This is an ID-based scheme that uses symmet-
ric bilinear pairings. The system parameters are
(q,G1,GT , P, e,H0, H1, Ppub), where q is a prime
number, G1 and GT are groups of order q, P is a
generator of G1, e : G1 × G1 → GT is an admis-
sible bilinear map and H0 ,H1 are two hash func-
tions that map strings of arbitrary length to G1 and
Zq respectively. Ppub is the public key of the key
generation center set as Ppub = sP , where s is its
master secret. Let (QA = H0(Aˆ), SA = sQA) and
(QB = H0(Bˆ), SB = sQB) be the public-private key
pairs of Aˆ and Bˆ respectively.
To sign a message m for Bˆ, Aˆ selects two ran-
dom values k ∈ Zq and t ∈ Z∗q and computes c =
e(QB , P )k, r = H1(m, c) and T = t−1kP − rSA. The
SDV signature is (T, r, t). Let the challenge SDV sig-
nature in the IV-CMA game be (T ∗, r∗, t∗). Ai ob-
tains SA by corrupting Aˆ. This scheme can be seen
as an extension of Saeednia et al. (2003) scheme to
the ID-based setting. However, the attack presented
on Saeednia et al. does not directly apply to this
scheme as the random seed k∗ cannot be extracted by
Ai from the challenge SDV signature. Nevertheless,
we show that Ai can still win the IV-CMA game. Ai
sets K∗ = t∗(T ∗+r∗SA) and then c∗ = e(QB ,K∗). It
guesses the SDV signature as real if r∗ = H1(m∗, c∗),
otherwise as random.
5 One-pass Key Establishment
One-pass (authenticated) key establishment (OPKE)
facilitates two parties to establish a shared secret by
transmitting a single message. OPKE protocols are
useful in non-interactive applications like E-mail sys-
tems, which do not demand the recipient to be al-
ways online. Although OPKE protocols cannot offer
the same level of security as two-pass/multi-pass pro-
tocols, they provide the right trade-off between se-
curity and efficiency. We present a OPKE protocol
by a simple modification to the one-round key estab-
lishment protocol of Jeong, Katz & Lee (2004). The
protocol is proven secure under the popular Bellare-
Rogaway models (Bellare & Rogaway 1994, Bellare,
Pointcheval & Rogaway 2000) after suitably adapt-
ing them to the one-pass case. This protocol is the
first OPKE protocol in the standard model with a
proof of security. It also turns out to be more effi-
cient than existing OPKE protocols in the random
oracle model (Krawczyk 2005, Ustaoglu 2008), when
the static Diffie-Hellman key between a pair of users
is precomputed.
5.1 Security Model for One-pass key estab-
lishment
To analyze the security of OPKE protocols, we use
the standard models of security for key establish-
ment (Bellare & Rogaway 1994, Bellare et al. 2000)
with a few modifications to suit OPKE protocols. As
in the earlier models a protocol π is modeled as a
collection of n programs running at different parties,
P1, . . . , Pn. Each invocation of π within a party is
defined as a session, and each party may have mul-
tiple sessions running concurrently. The communica-
tions network is controlled by an adversary Aπ, which
schedules and mediates all sessions between the par-
ties. Aπ is responsible for transmitting messages be-
tween parties, and may fabricate or modify messages
when desired. Aπ activates a party by sending appro-
priate protocol messages depending on the role Aπ
wants the party to play. In a OPKE protocol a party
can be either an initiator or a responder. Upon ac-
tivation, the parties perform some computations and
update their internal state as per the protocol. The
session ID sid is formed by concatenating all proto-
col messages with the identities of the participating
parties. sid is assumed to be unique amongst all ses-
sions between Pi and Pj . Two sessions are said to be
matching sessions if their session IDs are identical.
Aπ can perform the following queries.
• send(Pi, Pj , sid, role). A send query of the form
send(Pi, Pj , sid, I) activates a party Pi, where sid
is the session ID and I is the role initiator. In
response to this request Pi outputs a message
m intended for party Pj . A send query of the
form send(Pj , Pi, sid,m,R) activates a party Pj
with an incoming message m, where R is the role
responder.
• corrupt(Pi). With this query Aπ learns the static
private key of the party Pi. From this point on,Aπ may issue any message in which Pi is specified
as the sender and play the role of Pi.
• reveal(Pi, sid). This query returns the unexpired
session key (if any) accepted by Pi during a given
session sid.
• test(Pi, sid). To respond to this query, a random
bit b is selected. If b = 0 then the session key
is output. Otherwise, a random key chosen from
the probability distribution of session keys is re-
turned.
Aπ is allowed to continue with its execution by
issuing the above queries even after the test query.
Finally, it terminates by outputting its guess b′ on
distinguishing the session key from a random string.
We first define the notion of fresh session for
OPKE protocols that is central to the security def-
inition.
Definition 1 (Fresh Session). Let sid be a session
completed at a party Pi and let sid∗ be the matching
session at Pj (there may be no such sid∗). A session
sid is said to be fresh if none of the following condi-
tions holds:
• If Aπ makes a reveal(Pi, sid) or a reveal(Pj , sid∗)
(if sid∗ exists)
• If Pi is the initiator then Aπ makes either
corrupt(Pi) query before a send query containing
sid or corrupt(Pj)
• If Pi is the responder then Aπ makes either
corrupt(Pi) or corrupt(Pj)
Aπ wins the above game if it keeps the test session
fresh till the end of its execution and if b′ = b. The
advantage of Aπ is defined to be AdvAπ = |Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 |
Definition 2. A one-pass protocol π is secure if the
following conditions hold:
• When two honest parties complete protocol execu-
tion, they both should compute the same session
key with all but negligible probability.
• If AdvAπ is negligible in the security parameter.
Note that the definition of security takes care of
forward secrecy for the initiator i.e. the disclosure of
the static private key of an initiator does not compro-
mise the session keys established using that private
key in the previous sessions. However, to guarantee
initiator’s forward secrecy, the adversary needs to re-
main passive during the test session (Krawczyk 2005).
Recently, Ustaoglu (2008) propose a notion of
fresh session for OPKE protocols in the eCK
model (LaMacchia, Lauter & Mityagin 2007). The
difference between our notion and that of Ustaoglu is
that we do not consider session state reveal queries.
It is important to consider session state reveal queries
in a multi pass protocol, where a party has to keep
the session state until it receives appropriate protocol
messages from other participant and then to compute
the session key. On the other hand, the session state
in a OPKE protocol can be securely erased after the
sender computes the session key, which can be done
without waiting for any protocol messages. Hence,
session state reveal queries need not be considered
for OPKE protocols.
5.2 A One-pass Key Establishment Protocol
Jeong et al. (2004) propose a one-round two-party
protocol called T S3 and prove its security in the stan-
dard model. We present a one-pass version of T S3
and prove it secure in the standard model. Note that
one can also obtain one pass versions from the pro-
tocols of Okamoto (2007) and Boyd, Cliff, Nieto &
Paterson (2008) and use them to construct SDV sig-
natures. But, we consider Jeong, Katz and Lee’s pro-
tocol for efficiency reasons.
Let k be the security parameter, p be large prime
number and q be a prime factor of p− 1. Let g ∈ Z∗p
be a generator of order q and let G be the group gen-
erated by g. Let (xi, Yi = gxi) be the private-public
key pair of a party Pi where xi ∈ Zq. Similarly the
private-public key pair of Pj is (xj , Yj = gxj ). LetM
be a MAC scheme. The below two phases described
the OPKE protocol executed between two users Pi
and Pj acting as initiator and responder respectively.
Key Establishment Pi computes the static Diffie-
Hellman key between Pi and Pj as Ki,j = Y xij ,
which will be used for keying the MAC. It
chooses u R← Zq, computes U = gu and τ =
MKi,j (i‖j‖U) and sends (U, τ) to Pj .
Key Computation Pi computes the session key as
κi = Y uj . The party Pj first checks that the re-
ceived tag is valid using the static Diffie-Hellman
key computed as Kj,i = Y
xj
i . It then computes
the session key κj = Uxj .
Note that we have used the group elements as the
key for the MAC and also as the session key instead
of a random string. A simple way deriving key when
G ⊂ Z∗p is just by selecting the k most significant
bits or the k least significant bits of the elements
of G (Fouque, Pointcheval, Stern & Zimmer 2006).
Generic methods for implementing a suitable key
derivation function are given by Dodis, Gennaro,
H˚astad, Krawczyk & Rabin (2004) and Chevassut,
Fouque, Gaudry & Pointcheval (2005).
Theorem 1. Let Aπ be an adversary against the
proposed OPKE protocol. Then the advantage of
Aπ against the security of the protocol (with initia-
tor’s forward secrecy as defined in Section 5.1) is
AdvAπ (k) ≤ 2ns(2 ·AdvDDHAddh(k)+AdvMacF (k))+
2ns
q .
where ns is upper bound on the number of sessionsAπ may activate, AdvDDHAddh(k) is the advantage a
polynomial time algorithm Addh in solving the DDH
problem in G and AdvMacF (k) is the success proba-
bility of a forger F against the SUF-CMA notion of
the MAC.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B.
6 A Concrete SDV Signature Scheme
We now present an SDV signature scheme based on
the OPKE protocol proposed in Section 5. We obtain
the new SDV signature by using a message authen-
tication code along with the OPKE protocol. The
session key obtained in the protocol is used to com-
pute a tag on the given message. The protocol tran-
scripts together with the computed tag form the an
SDV signature. The verification can be done by first
computing the session key and then using it to verify
the tag on the input message. Below we present the
description of the scheme executed between a signer
Pi and a designated verifier Pj .
common-key-gen: This algorithm takes the security
parameter k as input and generates the system
parameters params = (p, q,G, g,M,S), where p
is a large prime number, q be a prime factor of
p− 1, g ∈ Z∗p is a generator of order q generating
the group G M is a MAC and S is the signature
space.
user-key-gen: This algorithm takes the security pa-
rameter k and params as input. The public-
private key pair of a user is generated in the
same way as in the the OPKE protocol. Let
(yi = gxi , xi) and (yj = gxj , xj) be the the
public-private key pairs of Pi and Pj respectively,
where xi, xj ∈ Zq.
sign: Let m ∈ {0, 1}∗ be the input message. The
signer Pi executes the OPKE protocol and gen-
erates the SDV signature σ = (U, τ1, τ2) as fol-
lows: Let (U, τ1) be the outgoing message of the
protocol and let κ be the session key established.
Pi computes the tag τ2 =Mκ(m).
verify: On receiving a purported SDV signature
(U, τ1, τ2) on a message m, a designated veri-
fier Pj does the following: Pj first executed the
OPKE protocol on the incoming message (U, τ1)
and computed the session key κ. It now accepts
the SDV signature only if τ2 is a valid tag on the
message m under the session key κ.
Security of the new SDV signature scheme.
We show that the proposed SDV signature signature
scheme is secure under the UF-CMA, IV-CMA and
NT-CMA notions defined in Section 3. Specifically
we prove the following theorems in Appendix C.
Theorem 2. Let Au be an adversary against
the UF-CMA notion of the SDV signature.
Then the advantage of Au is AdvAu(k) ≤
n(n− 1) (AdvMacF (k) + AdvAπ (k)) .
Theorem 3. Let Ai be an adversary against the
IV-CMA notion of the SDV signature. Then the
advantage of Ai is AdvAi(k) ≤ 2(AdvMacprf(k) +
AdvAπ (k)− 12s ).
Theorem 4. Let An be an adversary against the NT-
CMA notion of the SDV signature. Then the advan-
tage of An is AdvAn(k) = 0.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the existing security notions for
SDV signature are not adequate. We have then pro-
posed new notions of security in the multi-user set-
ting and all existing SDV signature schemes turned
out to be insecure under these revised notions. We
have then presented a concrete SDV signature scheme
and proven its security in the standard model. A new
one-pass key establishment protocol used to construct
the SDV signature scheme is of independent interest
in itself.
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A Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly describe the decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption, message authentication
codes and pseudorandom functions.
Notations. We denote by N the set of natural num-
bers. An event is negligible in a security parameter k
if it happens with a probability that is less than the
inverse of any polynomial in k.
A.1 The DDH Assumption.
Let k be a security parameter and let G be a group
of prime order q such that |q| = k and let g ∈ G be a
generator of G. Consider the following distributions:
DHG = {(g, ga, gb, gab) for a, b R← Zq} and
RG = {(g, ga, gb, gc) for a, b, c R← Zq}
We say that DDH assumption holds in G if DHG
and RG are indistinguishable for all polynomial-time
adversaries Addh. More formally, the advantage of
Addh given as AdvDDHAddh(k) = |Pr[Addh(1k, ρ) =
1|ρ R← DHG] − Pr[Addh(1k, ρ) = 1|ρ R← RG]| is negli-
gible in k.
A.2 Pseudo-Random Function Family
Let F = {fs}s∈S be a family of functions for security
parameter k ∈ N and with seed s ∈ S = S(k) = S(k).
Let C be an adversary that is given oracle access
to either Fs for s ∈R K or a truly random func-
tion with the same domain and range as the func-
tions in F. F is said to be pseudorandom if C ’s ad-
vantage in distinguishing whether it has access to
a random member of F or a truly random func-
tion is negligible in k, for all polynomial-time adver-
saries C . That is AdvPRFF,C(k) = |Pr[CFs(.)(1k) =
1]− Pr[CRand(.)(1k) = 1]| is negligible in k.
A.3 Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code (MAC) contains two
algorithms; Mac and verify. The Mac algorithm takes
a message m and a random key K as input and re-
turns a tag τ . The verify algorithm takes m, K and
the purported tag τ as input and returns true if τ is
valid tag on m under K and false otherwise.
The standard notion of security considered for
analyzing MAC schemes is strong existential un-
forgeability against chosen message attack (SUF-
CMA) (Bellare, Kilian & Rogaway 1994). The SUF-
CMA game is briefly described here.
The adversary F is given access to two oracles tag
and verify whose behavior is as below:
tag: On a query to this oracle with an input message
m, the challenger returns a tag τ computed on
m using K.
verify: On a query to this oracle with input (m, τ),
the challenger outputs true if τ is a valid tag on
m under K. Otherwise it returns false.
F wins the game if it outputs a message-tag pair
(m∗, τ∗) such that τ∗ is a valid tag onm∗ underK and
τ∗ was never returned from the tag oracle on input
m∗. The advantage of F , AdvMacF is its probabil-
ity of success in winning the SUF-CMA game. We
say that a MAC scheme M is SUF-CMA secure if
AdvMacF is negligible in k.
A method for designing a MAC is using a PRF.
The following theorem is proven in (Goldwasser &
Bellare 1996-2008)
Theorem 5. Let MAC : KeysMAC × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}s be a family of functions, and let q, t ≥ 1 be
integers. Then
Advuf−cmaMAC (t, q, dq) ≤ AdvprfMAC(t′, q) +
1
2s
(1)
where t′ = t+O(s+ d)
B Security Proof for the OPKE protocol
Note that a OPKE protocol can provide forward se-
crecy only for the initiator. Hence, in the test session
only the initiator is allowed to be corrupted after is-
suing the test query. This initiator could be either
owner of the test session or partner to the test ses-
sion (if exists). We consider two cases while proving
the security of our protocol. In the first case we prove
the security of the protocol when the initiator in the
test session is not corrupted, whereas the second case
proves the security of the protocol when the initiator
in the test session is allowed to be corrupted. Note
that we require Aπ to be passive in the second case,
hence there exists a matching session to the test ses-
sion.
Let ns be the upper bound on the number of ses-
sions invoked by Aπ. We prove the security of the
protocol in a sequence of games. We denote by Si the
event that b′ = b in Game i.
Case 1: Sender in the test session is not cor-
rupted. In this case the owner of the test session
may or may not have a partner.
Game 0. This is the original attack game described
in Section 5.1. By definition we have
AdvAπ = |2 · Pr[S0]− 1| (2)
Game 1. This is similar to the previous game except
that if two different sessions between a pair of
users output exactly the same message, the game
aborts.
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0] ≤ ns
q
(3)
Game 2. This is the same as the previous game ex-
cept that a random value t R← {1, 2, . . . , ns} is
chosen. If Aπ does not choose the t-th session as
the test session, the game aborts and Aπ outputs
a random bit. Let Guess be the event that Aπ
chooses t-th session as the test session.
Pr[S2] = Pr[S2|Guess] Pr[Guess] +
Pr[S2|¬Guess] Pr[¬Guess]
= Pr[S1] · 1
ns
+
1
2
·
(
1− 1
ns
)
(4)
Game 3. Game 3 is the same as Game 2 with the
following differences. Let Pi and Pj be the peers
of the t-th session chosen in Game 2 with Pi as
the initiator and Pj as the responder. The static
Diffie-Hellman key between Pi and Pj is replaced
a random element Z R← G. The only difference
between Game 2 and Game 3 is whether Z is
the Diffie-Hellman of the public keys of Pi and
Pj . Hence these two games are indistinguishable
under the DDH assumption.
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ AdvDDHAddh(k) (5)
Game 4. This game is the same as the previous
game except the game aborts if there has been a
query of the form send(Pj , Pi, t,m,R) such that
m contains a valid tag and the t-th session does
not have Pi as the partner. This is essentially the
existential unforgeability game played for the se-
curity of the MAC used in the protocol. Hence
we have
|Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ AdvMacF (k) (6)
Game 5. This game is the same as the previ-
ous game with the following difference: A
query of the form send(Pi, Pj , t, I), is answered
with an outgoing message Y ‖τi where τi =
Mackij (Pi‖Pj‖Y ) for Y R← G. Since Y is cho-
sen uniformly at random from G, we have
Pr[S5] = Pr[S4] (7)
Game 6. This is the same as the previous game ex-
cept that the session key here is substituted by a
random element from G. Similar to the argument
in Game 3, the games Game 6 and Game 5 are
indistinguishable under the DDH assumption.
|Pr[S6]− Pr[S5]| ≤ AdvDDHAddh(k) (8)
Pr[S6] is 12 since the adversary has no information
about the session key.
By combining the equations 2-8 we have
AdvAπ ≤ 2ns(2 · AdvDDHAddh(k) + AdvMacF (k))
+
2ns
q
(9)
Case 2: Sender in the test session is corrupted.
In this case, the test session would have a partner, as
the adversary needs to be passive in the test session.
Game 0. Same as Game 0 of Case 1.
Game 1. Same as Game 1 of Case 1.
Game 2. This is the same as the previous game ex-
cept that a random value t R← {1, 2, . . . , ns} is
chosen. If Aπ does not choose the t-th session or
its matching session as the test session, the game
aborts and Aπ outputs a random bit. Let Guess
be the event that Aπ chooses either the t-th ses-
sion or its matching session as the test session.
Pr[S2] = Pr[S2|Guess] Pr[Guess]
+Pr[S2|¬Guess] Pr[¬Guess]
= Pr[S1] · 2
ns
+
1
2
·
(
1− 2
ns
)
(10)
Game 3. This game is the same as the previous
game with the following difference. Let Pi and Pj
be the peers of the t-th session chosen in Game
2 with Pi as the initiator and Pj as the respon-
der. In this game the public key of Pj is replaced
with an element X R← G. This is game indistin-
guishable from the previous game as X is from
the same distribution as the public key of Pj .
Pr[S3] = Pr[S2] (11)
Game 4. This game is the same as the previ-
ous game with the following difference: A
query of the form send(Pi, Pj , t, I), is answered
with an outgoing message Y ‖τi where τi =
Mackij (Pi‖Pj‖Y ) for Y R← G. Since Y is cho-
sen uniformly at random from G, we have
Pr[S4] = Pr[S3] (12)
Game 5. This is the same as the previous game ex-
cept that the session key here is substituted by
a random element from G. Game 4 and Game
5 are indistinguishable under the DDH assump-
tion.
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ AdvDDHAddh(k) (13)
Pr[S5] is 12 since the adversary has no information
about the session key.
By combining Equations 2,3,10,11,12,13 we have
AdvAπ ≤ ns · AdvDDHAddh(k) +
2ns
q
(14)
From Equations 9 and 14, the advantage of Aπ in
Case 1 is greater than that in Case 2. Hence we have
AdvAπ ≤ 2ns(2 · AdvDDHAddh(k) + AdvMacF (k)) +
2ns
q .
C Security proof for the SDV signature
scheme
C.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove that the proposed SDV signature
scheme is secure under the UF-CMA notion in a se-
quence of games. Let Si the event that Au outputs a
valid SDV signature (m∗, σ∗, pk∗s , pk
∗
v) in Game i as
per the definition of UF-CMA in Section 3.1.
Game 0. This is the original UF-CMA game for
the SDV signature signatures as defined in Sec-
tion 3.1. All the queries of Au are answered as
per the definition. Hence we have
AdvAu(k) = Pr[S0] (15)
Game 1. This is the same game as the previous one
with the following difference. A signer U∗s and a
verifier U∗v are chosen at random at the beginning
of the game. If the adversary Au corrupts any of
the two chosen parties or outputs a forgery where
U∗s and U
∗
v are not the signer and verifier, then
the game aborts. U∗s and U
∗
r are therefore a guess
at the parties that Au will choose for the forgery
out of the total of n parties. The probability that
the guess is correct is 1/(n(n− 1)). Hence
Pr[S1] ≤ 1
n(n− 1) Pr[S0] (16)
Game 2. This is the same game as the previous one
except that the sign and verify queries involving
U∗s as the signer and U
∗
v as the verifier are mod-
ified as follows.
sign: on input m ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute U and τ1
as usual, but compute τ2 =Mκ(m) using a
random key κ. If U has already been used
in a sign query corresponding to U∗s and U
∗
r ,
then the same key κ is used.
verify: On input (U, τ1, τ2) on a message m, out-
put valid if (U, τ1) has been output before
on a sign query corresponding to U∗s and U
∗
v
and τ2 = Mκ(m) where κ is the one used
previously in the sign query. Otherwise out-
put invalid.
The only difference between Game 2 and Game 1
is whether a real session key or a random session
key, which by Theorem 1 are indistinguishable,
is used in producing the signature. Hence
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ AdvAπ (k) (17)
In Game 2, the event S2 corresponds toAu outputting
a forgery m∗, τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 for signer U
∗
s and verifier U
∗
v ,
where U∗, τ∗1 have been output previously in a sign
query . Since U∗, τ∗1 are independent of κ, Au has no
more information to produce a forgery corresponding
to κ that an adversary against the MAC functionM.
Hence
Pr[S2] ≤ AdvMacF (k) (18)
From equations 15 to 18 we have
AdvAu(k) ≤ n(n− 1) (AdvMacF (k) + AdvAπ (k)) (19)
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We prove that the proposed SDV signature
scheme is secure under the IV-CMA notion in a se-
quence of games. Let Si the event that Ai outputs a
bit b′ such that b′ = b in Game i as per the definition
of IV-CMA in Section 3.2.
Game 0. This is the original IV-CMA game for the
SDV signatures as defined in Section 3.2. All the
queries of Ai are answered as per the definition.
Hence we have
AdvAi(k) = |2 · Pr[S0]− 1| (20)
Game 1. This is the same game as the previous one
except that the behavior of the challenger in this
game is simulated by an adversary Aπ against
the OPKE protocol in Section 5.
sign: On input (m, pks, pkv), Aπ issues an establish-
session(pks, pkv, sid, I) and gets the outgoing
message (U, τ1). It obtains the computed ses-
sion key through a reveal(Us, sid) query and then
uses the session key to compute a tag τ2 on the
message m using the MAC scheme. Aπ finally
returns (U, τ1, τ2) as the SDV signature to Ai.
verify: On input (m,σ, pks, pkv), Aπ first parses
the SDV signature σ as (U, τ1, τ2). It issues an
establish-session(pkv, pks, sid, (U, τ1), R) and once
the session is accepted obtains the session key
via reveal(Uv, sid) query. This key is then used
to verify if τ2 is a valid tag on the message m.
corrupt: If Ai issues a corrupt query with a user’s
identity U as input, Aπ answers this query with
the long-term private key of the user U by issuing
a corrupt(U) query to its challenger.
When the event S1 happens, Aπ uses it to gain
advantage against the OPKE protocol as follows:
At the end of stage 1, Ai outputs (m∗, pk∗s , pk∗v).Aπ establishes t-th session by issuing an establish-
session(pk∗s , pk
∗
v , sid
∗, I) and obtains the outgoing
message (U, τ1) of the session. Now Aπ can select
the test session in one of the following ways.
1. the t-th session at U∗s or
2. the matching session at U∗v after issuing an
establish-session(pk∗v , pk
∗
s , sid
∗, σ∗1 , R)
As a response to the test query, the challenger
gives Kb to Aπ as described in Section 5.1. Aπ
computes τ∗2 as a tag on the message m
∗ using
the key Kb. The signature σ∗ = (U∗, τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is
given to Ai as an output of the challenge phase.
Finally, when the event S1 happens, Aπ simply
forwards the bit b′ to its challenger. Thus we
have
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ AdvAπ (k) (21)
Game 2. This is the same game as the previous one
with the following difference: The MAC τ∗2 in the
challenge SDV signature (U∗, τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) given to Ai
is replaced by τr
R← {0, 1}s. By the pseudoran-
domness of the underlying PRF, from Equation 1
we have
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ AdvMacF (k)− 12s (22)
As the challenge signature in this game is uni-
formly distributed in the signature space, we
have Pr[S2] = 1/2. From equations 20 to 22 we
have
AdvAi(k) ≤ 2(AdvMacprf(k) + AdvAπ (k)− 12s )(23)
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove that the proposed SDV signature
scheme is secure under the NT-CMA notion. Let S0
the event that Ai outputs a bit b′ such that b′ = b
in Game 0 as per the definition of NT-CMA in Sec-
tion 3.3.
The proof involves describing a polynomial algo-
rithm simulate that can generate a signature that has
the same distribution as an original SDV signature.
simulate takes as input the public of the signer, the
private key of the designated verifier and the mes-
sage on which the simulated SDV has to be gener-
ated. The proof is straightforward once we describe
the algorithm.
Game 0. This is the original NT-CMA game for the
SDV signatures as defined in Section 3.3. The
sign, verify and corrupt queries as normal. The
simulate query is answered by the executing the
following simulate algorithm.
simulate: On input (m, pks, pkv), the challenger
chooses u R← Zq and computes U = gu.
It then computes the static Diffie-Hellman
key between Us and Uv using the private
key Uv as Ksv = pkskvs . The session key
is generated as ksv = Uskv . The tags τ1
and τ2 are computed as τ1 =MKsv (U) and
τ2 = Mksv (m). The simulated signature
(m, τ1, τ2) is returned to An.
As per the definition we have
AdvAn(k) = |2 · Pr[S0]− 1| (24)
Note that the output of the simulate algorithm has
exactly the same probability distribution as the out-
put of the sign algorithm. Moreover, the simulated
signature is always verified to be valid by An. Hence,
we have Pr[S0] = 12 . Hence
AdvAn(k) = 0 (25)
